

## RETIRING APOLLO: OVID ON THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY

It has long been recognized that Cupid's intervention in Ovid's poetic project in *Amores* 1.1 functions as a humorous re-working of the cliché of the would-be epic poet diverted by a god to 'lighter' genres. What has received less attention is the question of whether it is particularly significant that a role which is usually played by Apollo, the patron god of poetry, is here taken over by Cupid. It is my contention that the displacement of Apollo by Cupid in *Amores* 1.1 forms part of a larger Ovidian project of sidelining the god in order for the poet to assert his own greatness and independence more loudly than ever. In addition to the Cupid encounter, Ovid's various disavowals of divine inspiration add flesh to the bones of the picture of his poetic independence, and have been the focus of some scholarship already, the proem to the *Ars Amatoria* being the most obvious and most fertile ground for such discussions.<sup>1</sup> The quarrel between Cupid and Apollo in *Metamorphoses* 1 has also been seen as a competition between genres, a meta-poetic struggle which playfully asserts the superiority of the elegiac and erotic over the epic within a poem which is, at least superficially, itself an epic. Apollo's subsequent unsuccessful attempt to rape Daphne displays him as a failed lover (and failed elegiac poet?) as well as a failed promoter of epic.<sup>2</sup> What I want to do here is collect together the various appearances of Apollo in Ovid's love poetry,<sup>3</sup> as well as some instances when we might have expected him to appear, but he does not. I believe that it is possible to see these not just as a string of unconnected jokes at the god's expense, but as a conspiracy of one against Apollo, and a conspiracy with both poetic and political ramifications.

The importance of Apollo to the Augustan regime is a familiar subject: the identification between Octavian/Augustus and the god, which began in the forties B.C.,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See in particular A. La Penna, 'L'usus contro Apollo e le Muse: Nota a Ovidio, *Ars am* 1.25–30', *ASNP* 9 (1979), 985–97; J. D. McLaughlin, 'Vengeance with a twist: another look at the proem to Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*', *Maia* 31 (1979), 269–71; J. F. Miller, 'Callimachus and the *Ars Amatoria*', *CPh* 78 (1983), 26–34 and 'Disclaiming divine inspiration: a programmatic pattern', *WS* 20 (1986), 151–64. On the relationship of Ovid and the Muses in the *Metamorphoses*, see A. Sharrock, 'An a-musing tale: gender, genre and Ovid's battles with inspiration in the *Metamorphoses*', in E. Spentzou and D. Fowler (edd.), *Cultivating the Muse* (Oxford, 2002), 207–27. The discussion of Apollo in *Ars Amatoria* 2 in A. Sharrock, *Seduction and Repetition in Ovid's Ars Amatoria* 2 (Oxford, 1994), ch. 4, is important, too, and overlaps significantly with my own thoughts on the subject.

<sup>2</sup> See W. S. M. Nicoll, 'Cupid, Apollo and Daphne (Ovid *Met.* 1.452ff)', *CQ* 30 (1980), 174–82; P. E. Knox, 'In pursuit of Daphne', *TAPA* 120 (1990), 183–202. P. Hardie, *Ovid's Poetics of Illusion* (Cambridge, 2002), 45–50, following the work of Peter Brooks, argues that Daphne herself becomes a text (*tenuis liber*—'thin bark'/'slender book'—*Met.* 1.549) at once inaccessible and powerful, much like Corinna.

<sup>3</sup> I limit myself to the early elegies for reasons of space, but I hope that the argument will apply (at least to some extent) to Apollo's treatment in Ovid's later works as well. At any rate, this is, as I have already implied, true of the Cupid–Apollo scene in *Metamorphoses* 1.

<sup>4</sup> At least, it is widely held that the association dated back this far. However, R. Gurval, *Actium and Augustus* (Ann Arbor, 1995), 87–111 argues that the connection began in the 30s and has in any case been rather overstated by scholars.

reached its peak with the construction of the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, which was directly connected to Augustus' house by a ramp.<sup>5</sup> Although Apollo had been established in Rome already for around 400 years, in earlier times he was not such a prominent god, and was worshipped primarily as a healer at the temple of Apollo Medicus. His popularity as a healer seems to have been eclipsed by the advent of Aesculapius in 291 B.C.,<sup>6</sup> so the revamping of the god in the first century B.C. was perhaps long overdue.<sup>7</sup> The close connections between Apollo and Augustus (and through him the whole of Rome) were made apparent by the mythologizing of the Battle of Actium, presented as a victory for Rome with Apollo helping.<sup>8</sup> As Ogilvie phrases it, 'Apollo epitomised everything that was new and young—and successful'.<sup>9</sup> The temple of Palatine Apollo became not only a visible reminder of this connection in Rome, but also one of the most ubiquitous edifices in Augustan Latin poetry.<sup>10</sup>

This leads us to another important aspect of Apollo in Augustan culture. Not only was he the god who sanctioned Octavian's victory at Actium and who continued to protect Rome, but he was also, via his poetic side, the divine face of the flourishing of the arts over which Augustus hoped to preside. The very duality of Apollo's nature, as poet and warrior, was embraced by the iconography of his temple on the Palatine: the god's role as the archer-ally of Actium was represented allusively in the reliefs on the temple's doors,<sup>11</sup> while his cult statue was *citharoedus*,<sup>12</sup> holding a lyre: the figure of the poet. In the porticoes adjacent to the temple were Greek and Latin libraries,<sup>13</sup> which again underscored the connection between Apollo, Augustus and high culture. Indeed, according to Servius and Ps. Acro, Augustus set up a statue of himself in the guise of Apollo with all his attributes in this library.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Cf. P. Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor, 1988), 51, along with Figure 40 on p. 52. See also J. Gagé, *Apollon Romain* (Paris, 1955), 522–3; N. Hannestad, *Roman Art and Imperial Policy* (Aarhus, 1988), 55–8; Gurval (n. 4), ch. 2; G. K. Galinsky, *Augustan Culture* (Princeton, 1996), 213ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Fritz Graf's entry on Asclepius in *OCD*<sup>3</sup>: he 'was more easily accessible than Apollo who could proclaim lofty indifference towards man and his destiny (*Il.* 22.462–6); even as a god, Asclepius was never so distant'. Also, cf. D. C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic* (Oxford, 1991), 217, who notes Ovid's preference for the Republican story of Aesculapius' migration to Rome in *Metamorphoses* 15 over the more 'obvious' stories of the imported gods Apollo and Cybele which had strongly Augustan connotations.

<sup>7</sup> Octavian/Augustus was not the only Roman to lay special claim to Apollo. Plutarch says that Sulla carried round an image of Apollo wherever he went (*Sulla* 29), while both sides are reported to have cried 'Apollo' as they went into battle at Philippi in 42 B.C. (Zanker, n. 5 at 49). For Apollo's earlier connections with the Julii as well as Augustus, see S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford, 1971), 12–15.

<sup>8</sup> Apollo's help at Actium is acknowledged outside literature by the institution of the Actian games at Nicopolis, and the introduction of the cult title Actius. It seems that Virgil expanded on this at *Aeneid* 8.675–728 by inventing Apollo's physical intervention in the battle. Propertius takes up the idea at 3.11 and 4.6.

<sup>9</sup> R. M. Ogilvie, *The Romans and Their Gods* (London, 1969), 115.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Virgil, *Aeneid* 8.720; Horace, *Odes* 1.31.1; *Epistles* 1.3.17; 2.1.216–17; Propertius 2.31; 4.6; Ovid, *Amores* 2.2.3–4; *Ars Amatoria* 1.73–4; 3.389–90.

<sup>11</sup> On one door was illustrated the story of the Gauls' failed assault on Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi, and on the other the myth of the slaughter of Niobe's children, shot down by Apollo and Artemis to punish Niobe's hubristic claim to be luckier than their own mother, Leto. (Cf. Propertius 2.31.13–14.)

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Propertius 2.31.5–6. See also Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace, *Odes* 1.31.1.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Horace, *Epistles* 1.13.17; 2.1.216–17; Suetonius, *Aug.* 29.3.

<sup>14</sup> Servius *ad Ver. Ecl.* 4.10; Ps. Acro *ad Hor. Epist.* 1.3.17. Gurval (n. 4), 290 argues that this is the crude interpretation of a later generation, and that Augustus' response to such an identification would be that any resemblance was 'fortuitous coincidence or the providence of fate

Therefore, when Apollo appears prominently in Augustan literature, as he frequently does, he brings with him not only his literary baggage as the long-standing divine patron of poetry, but also his more recent political baggage. In Augustan Rome, the poetical has become the political. In the following discussion, I will focus to a greater degree on the more literary aspects of Ovid's treatment of Apollo, with overt observations on the political implications only surfacing from time to time. However, I have started with this brief examination of the political side of Apollo at Rome in order to bring it to the forefront of the reader's mind. At every stage when Ovid seems to be engaging in an act of literary daring, making a declaration of poetic independence, the possible political overtones should be considered too.<sup>15</sup>

Turning now to Ovid, I begin, like the poet, not with Apollo but with Cupid, and his intervention in the poet's life and work. From the outset it must be acknowledged that *Amores* 1.1 does not represent the first time that Love takes on the role of poetic dictator,<sup>16</sup> but it is still a role in which we are more accustomed to seeing Apollo. This poem is set up as a repetition of the Apollo-and-poet scenes familiar from Callimachus' *Aetia* fr. 1, Virgil's *Eclogue* 6, Propertius 3.3, and Horace, *Odes* 4.15.<sup>17</sup> The first stage of the cliché comes from the image in Callimachus of the author being given poetic fashion tips by Apollo. This is developed in Latin literature into the *topos* of *recusatio*, a polite refusal to write a military epic which is sanctioned by the intervention of Apollo, the first extant example being Virgil, *Eclogue* 6.3–8.<sup>18</sup> The basic elements are present in *Amores* 1.1: the poet ready to write epic and the god with his superior aesthetic sense ready to forbid the poet to follow that path. There is, however, a different, more playful tone, to suit the different, more playful god, Cupid. Though in a way it makes perfect sense to have a love god inspire love poetry, perhaps we can see some justification for the narrator's protests about Cupid's indifference to the idea that each god should stick to his own traditional sphere of influence:

Quis tibi, saeue puer, dedit hoc in carmina iuris?  
Pieridum uates, non tua turba sumus.  
quid, si praecripiat flauae Venus arma Mineruae,  
uentilet accensas flaua Minerua faces?

and the will of the immortal gods'. Which is to say that Augustus might not have openly set himself up as Apollo, but winked at the possibility.

<sup>15</sup> For the interconnectedness of the poetics of inspiration with politics in Latin poetry, see D. Fowler, 'Masculinity under threat? The poetics and politics of inspiration in Latin poetry', in Spentzou and Fowler (n. 1), 141–59.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Propertius 1.7.15–18 and 2.13.1–8 (but note that here, as in 2.1, the poet soon moves to talk of the importance of his *puella*: here as ideal reader, in 2.1 as actual source of inspiration). In addition to these parallels, J. C. McKeown, *Ovid: Amores. Volume II. A Commentary on Book One* (Leeds, 1989) ad loc. mentions Euripides fr. 663 Nauck ('Eros teaches the man who was unmusical before to be a poet'). In *Epodes* 14, Horace is prevented from finishing his book of poetry by the intervention of the love god, while in *Odes* 1.19, Venus overwhelms the poet with love and stops him from writing (epics?) about the wars against the Parthians and Scythians.

<sup>17</sup> Hardie (n. 2), 51 terms this an 'intertextual encounter'.

<sup>18</sup> Horace parodies the *recusatio* at *Satires* 1.10.31–5, where Quirinus appears to the poet, telling him not to write in Greek, since there is already far too much of that sort of thing about. R. O. A. M. Lyne, *Horace: Behind the Public Poetry* (New Haven and London, 1995) remarks, 'Horace's presumption that he can parody perhaps suggests a wider prevalence of the motif than surviving sources show: i.e. that others had already taken Vergil's hint' (p. 34). A. Cameron, *Callimachus and his Critics* (Princeton, 1995), 454–7 argues that the basic form of the *recusatio* had in fact already been established in the Hellenistic era (but post Callimachus) as a motif in bucolic poetry.

quis probet in siluis Cererem regnare iugosis,  
lege pharetratae uirginis arua coli?  
crinibus insignem quis acuta cuspidē Phoebum  
instruat, Aoniam Marte mouente lyram?

*Amores* 1.1.5–12

Who gave you rights over this poem, savage boy? I'm the poet/priest of the Muses, not one of your crowd. What if Venus should grab the weapons of blonde Minerva, and blonde Minerva fanned the burning torches of love? Who would approve of Ceres reigning in the wooded hills, while the fields were tended under the rule of the quiver-bearing virgin Diana? Who would provide Phoebus, beautifully coiffed, with a sharp spear, while Mars strummed on the Aonian lyre?

Cupid is god of love, not of poetry. Now, the implacable and rather violent insistence of the love god that someone should simply *fall in love* is familiar stuff—compare Sappho and Anacreon's characterizations of the god's irresistibility, and Propertius' description of Amor standing on the poet's head<sup>19</sup>—but that Ovid's Cupid should direct his implacable and violent force to making the poet write first and love second *is* unusual.<sup>20</sup> For most love poets, their verse is figured as their own response to the passion pressed upon them by the god. We might also contrast the interventions of Apollo in Callimachus, Virgil, and Propertius—there the god is firm, makes his requirements clear, but he is also in a way respectful of the poets, and eager that they should channel their talent in the appropriate way. Apollo offers suggestions the poets would be fools to ignore, rather than imposing his aesthetic on them by some physical onslaught. Cupid fixes Ovid with an arrow and steals a foot of his verse away. He is a poetic dictator, and the image of the poet walking in the god's triumphal procession in *Amores* 1.2 amply confirms this impression.<sup>21</sup>

There is another important difference between *Amores* 1.1 and the original scene from the *Aetia*, *Eclogues*, and so on. Cupid, though the interfering god, does not deliver the poem's main speech—that task is given to the narrator. Pride of place is thus given not to divine instructions about poetic style and subject,<sup>22</sup> but to the poet's attempt to scold and refusal to obey the god. Cupid may have the upper hand, but the poet is still the main focus of attention, and he is also a poet in the process of coming to understand that convention need not always be followed to the letter. Here it may work against him, as Cupid defies convention to order him to write, but the poet soon learns how to manipulate poetic customs and expectations to his own advantage. Indeed, the tables will be turned on Cupid at the start of both the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Remedia Amoris*, where it will be the god who is bullied into submission and collaboration by the poet.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, although for the moment the poet of the

<sup>19</sup> Sappho fr. 47, 130 (Lobel & Page); Anacreon 357, 358 (Page); Propertius 1.1.3–6.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. D. F. Kennedy, *The Arts of Love* (Cambridge, 1993), 58–63.

<sup>21</sup> For the god of love as *triumphator*, compare Propertius 2.8.40, *mirum, si de me iure triumphat Amor?* ('why wonder if Love rightly triumphs over me?'). See McKeown (n. 16) on *Amores* 1.2 for more parallels, including the interesting reference to a long poem on a *triumphus Cupidinis* in Lactantius *Inst.* 1.11.1.

<sup>22</sup> Cupid's *actions* are, of course important. Also, his speech, however brief (*quod . . . canas, uates, accipe . . . opus*—'Take this work as yours to sing, poet', 1.24), contains an interesting combination of the poetic and the erotic through the *double entendre* on *opus*, which primarily means the poetic 'work' but can also mean sexual 'work', even the penis. See J. N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (London, 1982), 57 and Kennedy (n. 20), 59–63.

<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the opening of the *Remedia Amoris* functions in many ways as a replay of *Amores* 1.1, and a replay which allows the poet to assert his independence from Cupid more successfully and more openly. Note in particular the clear shift in power as the god, browbeaten by the poet's

*Amores* is a slave to the love god, he has been shown that the traditional god of poetry, Apollo, need not always be in control of a poetic work. Indeed, it might be possible in *Amores* 1.15 to see a demonstration of that lesson learned. There the poet rejects the envy of others and the common tastes of the crowd—sentiments very similar to those voiced by Callimachus' Apollo in *Aetia* fr. 1 and the *Hymn to Apollo*. What had been Apollo's poetic opinion in Callimachus is now the poet's own in the *Amores*. Apollo appears there to serve Ovid with poetic water, not to direct him to the pure springs which he himself loves.<sup>24</sup>

As I mentioned earlier, Ovid is not the only poet to give Apollo's part as god of inspiration to Cupid instead: in *Elegy* 2.13, Propertius does just that. Indeed, Propertius' Amor points the poet in a distinctly Hesiodic direction, ordering him to live in Ascrea's grove.<sup>25</sup> Since, in the post-Callimachean age, Hesiod is to some extent identical with, or at least strongly associated with, Callimachus himself,<sup>26</sup> one of the things that Propertius' love god seems to be doing here is enabling the poet to be, broadly, Callimachean without reference to the primary poetic authority in Callimachus, Apollo. Nevertheless, Propertius elsewhere redresses the balance,<sup>27</sup> and restores the Callimachean poetic order by allowing Apollo primacy once more. The Ovidian elegist, by contrast, never allows Apollo the upper hand in his poetry. He continues Amor's work of trespass into the realm of the poet-god. A certain disaffection with, or disassociation from, Apollo which had been hinted at in Propertius and Tibullus is now intensified and replayed in more consistent fashion.

It is worth pausing for a while to look in more detail at these hints of disaffection with Apollo in the other elegists, in order to set the Ovidian game into context and into relief. At the opening of his second book of elegies, the Propertian lover-poet is still keen to emphasize the power his mistress has over him: *non haec Calliope, non haec mihi cantat Apollo: l ingenium nobis ipsa puella facit* (2.1.3–4: 'Calliope doesn't sing this to me, nor does Apollo: the girl herself makes my inspiration'). The close identification of his *puella* with his poetic inspiration (as well as his poetic book)<sup>28</sup> has been established from the start: *Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit ocellis* (1.1.1: 'Cynthia first captured miserable me with her eyes'). A departure from the pure stream of

argument, says *propositum perfice . . . opus* ('complete the work you have suggested'). The contrast between this and Cupid's order at *Amores* 1.1.24 that the poet should write the work that the god dictates is clear.

<sup>24</sup> Callimachus, *Hymn to Apollo* 110–12 treats pure springs as analogues of the type of poetry approved by the god. It seems likely that Callimachus also saw poetic *inspiration* in liquid terms: a reference to the Hippocrene (the spring created when Pegasus' hoof struck the ground on Mount Helicon) in *Aetia* fr. 2 might point this way. Cf. A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik. Untersuchungen zu Hesiodos, Kallimachos, Properz und Ennius* (Heidelberg, 1965), 72–5 and 98–102.

<sup>25</sup> *hic (Amor) me tam gracilis uetuit contemnere Musas, l iussit et Ascreaem sic habitare nemus* ('Love forbade me to despise the Muses so graceful, and ordered me to live like this in Ascrea's grove', Prop. 2.13.3–4). Ascrea is Hesiod's home town.

<sup>26</sup> Callimachus' appreciation of Hesiod is well documented (e.g. *Aetia* fr. 112, *Iambus* 3, *Epigram* 29). Note especially that *Aetia* fr. 2 retells the story of Hesiod's initiation by the Muses which he told at the start of the *Theogony*. The Callimachus–Hesiod–Apollo connection becomes important again at the opening of the *Ars Amatoria*, more on which later.

<sup>27</sup> See Propertius 3.1–3 in particular.

<sup>28</sup> For Cynthia as the name both of his book and of his girlfriend, cf. 2.24.1–2: *tu loqueris, cum sis iam noto fabula libro l et tua sit toto Cynthia lecta foro?* ('You can talk, when you are gossip-fodder with your famous book, and your Cynthia has been read throughout the forum!'). Cf. M. Wyke, 'Written women: Propertius' *Scripta Puella*', *JRS* 77 (1987), 47–61.

Apolline inspiration this may be,<sup>29</sup> but can we forget either that Propertius' beloved advertises his (her?) allegiance to the same god through her very name: Cynthia?<sup>30</sup> Tibullus' Delia reminds us too of his Apolline poetic affiliations.<sup>31</sup> Ovid's mistress, when finally named in *Amores* 1.5, has nothing intensely, immediately Apolline about her; Corinna, the Greek girl<sup>32</sup> who shares her name with a lyric poetess, if anything reminds us more of Catullus' Lesbia (via another famous lyric poetess, Sappho).<sup>33</sup> Even if we discount the force of the reminiscence of Apollo in Cynthia's name (which is, after all, not mentioned in 2.1, though neither are we given much reason to think the *puella* to be any other), Propertius undermines (or at least complicates) his assertion of independence from Apollo and the Muses in 2.1 by his reliance on them elsewhere. As well as in the openly Callimachean 3.3, Propertius' close relationship with these deities is stressed elsewhere: for example, 1.8.41–2 (*sunt igitur Musae, neque amanti tardus Apollo, / quis ego fretus amo: Cynthia rara meast!*: 'so there are Muses, and Apollo isn't slow for a lover; relying on them, I love—exquisite Cynthia is mine!'); 3.1.7–8 (*a ualeat, quicumque Phoebum moratur in armis! / exactus tenui pumice uersus eat*: 'Farewell, whoever delays Phoebus in arms! Verse should go precise and smoothed by delicate pumice'); 3.2.9–10 (*miremur, nobis et Baccho et Apolline dextro / turba puellarum si mea uerba colit?*: 'why do I wonder, when Bacchus and Apollo are at my right hand, if a host of girls hangs on my words?').<sup>34</sup>

Tibullus also shares this tendency to rehabilitate Apollo as much as he rejects him; even where he complains of the powerlessness of Apollo and the Muses to help him in

<sup>29</sup> And a departure from the Callimachean stream: not only does Propertius deny Apollo's influence, but he also rejects Calliope, who was the first of the Muses to tell Callimachus the causes of things (in direct speech) in the *Aetia* (fr. 7). Thanks to Oliver Lyne for making the importance of this double rejection clear to me.

<sup>30</sup> Note that Cynthia 'herself' has a close relationship with the god: *cum tibi praesertim Phoebus sua carmina donet / Aoniamque libens Calliopea lyram*, 1.2.27–8: 'since for sure Phoebus gives you his songs, and Calliope freely gives you her Aonian lyre'. S. Hinds, 'Generalising about Ovid', in A. J. Boyle (ed.), *The Imperial Muse. Ramus Essays on Roman Literature of the Empire* (Berwick, 1988), 4–31, makes the important observation that 'what at first sight looks like a *disavowal* of Apolline influence in favour of a wholly personal inspiration is actually at an important level a *redefinition* of Apolline influence. Cynthia yields—but only to Cynthia' (12, his italics).

<sup>31</sup> Apollo is often titled 'Cynthius' (after the mountain on Delos where he was born), and 'Delius' after the island of his birth. Note, however, that 'Delia' could also hint at Apollo's twin sister Diana, as indeed could 'Cynthia'. Nevertheless, Gallus' beloved Lycoris is probably associated with another cult title of Apollo, Lycoreus, which is not shared with his sister. (Cf. K. F. H. Bruchmann, *Epitheta Deorum* [Leipzig, 1893] on Apollo and Artemis.) It seems possible, then, that the primary connection for the elegists is with Apollo, but that Propertius and Tibullus broaden the associations first established by Gallus to include a play with Apollo's sister Diana as well.

<sup>32</sup> For the pun on the Greek word for *puella*, κόρη, in Corinna's name, cf. J. C. McKeown, *Ovid: Amores. Volume I: Text and Prolegomena* (Liverpool, 1987), 21. Also, M. Buchan, 'Ovidius Imperator: beginnings and endings of love poems and empire in the *Amores*', *Arethusa* 28 (1995), 53–85, at 68–71.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Hinds (n. 30), 6: '... significantly, in naming his mistress after the Greek poetess Corinna, Ovid bypasses the Augustan elegiac procedure of choosing feminised cult names of Apollo ... in favour of a return to Catullan practice'.

<sup>34</sup> I should emphasize that I do not wish to imply that Propertius' take on Apollo is a simple one, or even always an amicable one. He appears as lover, poet, and warrior, and these roles are not always compatible. In Books 3 and 4 in particular, the god's violent (and epic) aspect is explored more fully by the elegiac poet (e.g. 3.9.39, 3.11.69, 4.6). See also Miller (n. 1, 1983 and 1986), who argues that Propertius is playing one Callimachean motif off against another, noting that in 2.1, where Apollo's inspiration is rejected, the poet goes on to justify his choice to write love poetry by citing Callimachus as a predecessor (2.1.39–46).

his love, telling the Muses, *ite procul, Musae, si non prodestis amanti* (2.4.15: 'be off with you, Muses, if you're no help to a lover'), Apollo is still called the *carminis auctor* ('the poem's author': 2.4.13). Although it does not work in the poet's favour at the moment, the elegies he writes are presented as being inspired by (even composed by) the god. Indeed, the very next poem in the collection is a prayer to Phoebus, which, while not unambiguously patching up the relationship between the poet and Apollo as regards love, does again voice the hope that the elegist's proximity to the gods might help him in affairs of the heart: *at tu—nam diuum seruat tutela poetas—I praemoneo, uati parce, puella, sacro* (2.5.113–14: 'but you—for the gods' protection keeps poets safe—I warn you, girl, spare the sacred poet'). There is, however, one Tibullan elegy, 2.3, which treats the god in a steadily irreverent way which one might even term Ovidian. There, the poet justifies his own position of abject servitude to his *puella* by reference to the story of Apollo's erotic servitude to Admetus. This, the first extended mythical *exemplum* in Tibullus' work, regards the god with an amused eye as he neglects his oracles and embarrasses his sister Diana by milking cows and tending the herd (15–26). To his mother Leto's despair, Apollo's trade-mark lovely locks are transformed into the bumpkin's shaggy hair (27–30),<sup>35</sup> and he becomes a *fabula*, a source of gossip (35), much like the elegiac poet himself.<sup>36</sup> As Murgatroyd observes, '[w]e are taken from the poet unsuccessful in love to the god of poetry unsuccessful in love'.<sup>37</sup> Interestingly, despite the obvious, stated similarities between the poet's own position and Apollo's, the language he uses to tell Apollo's story rarely reveals sympathy, but rather a jeering contempt: *Delos ubi nunc, Phoebe, tua est? ubi Delphice Pytho? I nempe Amor in parua te iubet esse casa* ('Where's your Delos now, Phoebus? Where's your Delphic Pytho? No doubt Love orders you to stay in a little hut', 31–2). Apollo is to come out of this no better (if not worse) than Tibullus himself, tortured by cruel Nemesis, for whom he would even endure chains.<sup>38</sup> This is an interesting and important example of irreverent treatment of Apollo in his role as a lover—indeed, it has elements in common with Ovid's later version of the god unsuccessful in love in the Daphne episode of *Metamorphoses* 1<sup>39</sup>—and it should also be noted that there is a

<sup>35</sup> Apollo's long hair seems to give him a somewhat feminine aspect. Might it be going too far to see in his *inornatum . . . caput crinesque solutos* ('unadorned head and loosened hair', 29) a comical reflection of the Propertian rejection of over-adorned hair in his girlfriend at 1.2.1? The joke continues at *Amores* 1.14.31–2, where the *puella*'s lovely hair (now ruined through over-dyeing) is said to have been such as Apollo and Bacchus would want for themselves, while at *Ars Amatoria* 3.141–2 Apollo's hairstyle is actually recommended to the girls. As R. Gibson, *Ovid, Ars Amatoria Book 3* (Cambridge, 2003), ad loc. points out, surviving portraits testify that women actually did adopt the 'Apollo-look', with their hair passed through a knot at the back of the head and spread out over their shoulders. The mere suggestion, therefore, that Apollo looks like a girl is neither new nor particularly controversial. Nevertheless, it need not lack any humorous punch at all.

<sup>36</sup> As is implied by the rest of lines 35–6 ('but he who cares about his girl would rather be a source of gossip than a god without love'). For *fabula* in this sense, cf. Tibullus 1.4.83 and Propertius 2.24.1.

<sup>37</sup> P. Murgatroyd, *Tibullus Elegies 2* (Oxford, 1994), ad 2.3.11–28.

<sup>38</sup> Is it perhaps significant that this, the first poem which names Tibullus' mistress as Nemesis rather than Delia, is one which also degrades Apollo? In other words, the god is reduced in status both explicitly, through the myth, and implicitly, through the change of girls' names from one which reminds us of Apollo to one which reminds us of an older, independent goddess, the daughter of Night.

<sup>39</sup> In particular, note that the seeds of the quarrel between Apollo and Cupid might be sown in Tib. 2.3.32 (quoted above), where Amor is imagined to order Phoebus about. Also, compare Tibullus' observation that, despite being the god of medicine, Apollo could not cure himself

concomitant, if muted, downgrading of Apollo as god of *poetry*. The description opens with the observation that Apollo's lyre was no use to him in the sphere of love (12), and some lines later we are presented with the delightful picture of the cattle as Apollo's unappreciative audience: *o quotiens ausae, caneret dum ualle sub alta, / rumpere mugitu carmina docta boues!* ('Oh how many times, while he sang in the deep valley, did the cows dare to break in on his learned songs with their lowing!', 23–4). Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Tibullus' campaign against Apollo (if such it be) is short-lived, and the god can reappear soon after, in *Elegy* 2.5, with his dignity and poetic authority to all intents and purposes intact.

It is my feeling that, by contrast with Tibullus and Propertius, who want to preserve Apollo as their poetic friend and patron, despite the occasional tiff, Ovid rarely, if ever, takes the god's input and authority seriously. He claims the support of Apollo and the Muses at *Amores* 1.3.11–12, at *Phoebus comitesque nouem uitisque repertor / hac faciunt et me qui tibi donat Amor* ('but Phoebus and his nine companions and the discoverer of the vine are at work over here, and Love, who gives me to you'), but this is part of a conventional<sup>40</sup> list also including Apollo's rival Amor (in the quote) and the qualities of fidelity, pure morals, simplicity, and chastity (in the following lines, 13–14). This is hard to take seriously from the poet who will soon go on to talk of his naughtiness, his *nequitia*, and who in this very poem undermines his claims to fidelity by recalling the myths of Jupiter's numerous adulterous dalliances. Moreover, it needs to be remembered that this statement is addressed to the *puella*—it forms part of the poet's seductive rhetoric, and as such tells the *puella* (who is more conventional than the poet himself?) what she expects to hear.<sup>41</sup> Again, at 3.12.17–18, the poet claims to be one of Apollo and the Muses' favoured few, when he professes to wish that he was not just so damn good at poetry: *auersis utinam tetigissem carmina Musis, / Phoebus et inceptum destituisset opus!* ('would that I had tried my poems when the Muses had turned away, and that Phoebus would have deserted the work as it began!') Yet Apollo did, in a sense, desert Ovid at the very start of his work: Cupid took his place, and the work suffered not one jot because of this. Moreover, the involvement of Apollo and the Muses is mentioned in a line directly following the statement, *ingenium mouit sola Corinna meum* ('Corinna alone stirs my inspiration' 3.12.16): the poet here clearly recalls Propertius' statement that his *puella* was his sole inspiration in 2.1 (discussed above), and thereby recalls his predecessor's rejection of Apollo even as he claims that the god was ever present in his composition. Even in the least exceptionable example of the Ovidian narrator taking the traditional line of the poet loved by Apollo and the Muses, in the protest about his mistress' closed door at 3.8.23–4 (*ille ego Musarum purus Phoebique sacerdos / ad rigidas canto carmen inane fores*: 'I am that spotless priest of the Muses and Phoebus, I who sing a useless song to unbending gates') there lurks another possible joke. Ovid borrows the solemnity of the poet-god Apollo in order to

(13–14) with *Metamorphoses* 1.521–4; the uselessness of prophecy hinted at in Tib. 2.3.31 is made absolutely explicit at *Met.* 1.491, *suaque illum oracula fallunt* ('and his own oracles deceive him').

<sup>40</sup> Apollo, the Muses, and Amor are accompanied by Bacchus. For Bacchus' importance to the elegiac poet, cf. Tibullus 2.1.3; 2.3.67–70; Propertius 3.2.9; 3.17. Also, *Ars* 3.347–8, *o ita, Phoebe, uelis, ita uos, pia numina uatum, / insignis cornu Bacche nouemque deae!* ('Oh grant this, Phoebus, grant it, you sacred powers of poets, and you, Bacchus, marked out with your horn, and the nine goddesses'). For the triad of Apollo, Bacchus, and the Muses, cf. Callimachus, *Iambi* 1.7–8 (the first surviving instance) and, for example, Propertius 4.6.75–6 and Lygdamus 4.43–4. Thanks to the anonymous referee for these examples.

<sup>41</sup> Thanks to Alison Sharrock for this point.



pull rank, to express his outrage that such an august personage as himself should be an *exclusus amator*, yet this solemnity is also ridiculous, burlesqued, and the song over which Apollo presides is *inane*, 'useless'. Again, in *ille ego*, we may recall the poet's self-introduction, once more independent of Apollo, at the opening of Book 2: *ille ego nequitiae Naso poeta meae* (2.1.2: 'I am that Naso, poet of my own naughtiness').<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in the phrase *Musarum . . . Phoebique sacerdos* (23), there comes an echo of Horace's self-definition as the *Musarum sacerdos* in *Odes* 3.1.3.<sup>43</sup> Ovid borrows and burlesques the solemnity not only of the poet-god Apollo, it seems, but also of the poet Horace in patriotic mood.

So Ovid the love poet makes little reference to a poet's debt to Apollo and, where he does, he seems to be denying or at least questioning it. He also underplays the god's aspect as a lover, making no overt reference to this side of the god in the *Amores* (in contrast with the *Metamorphoses*). Apollo appears (but briefly) as a lover in Propertius 1.2, as the unsuccessful suitor of Marpessa, who prefers the mortal man Idas to the god: *Idae et cupido quondam discordia Phoebus / Eueni patriis filia litoribus* (17–18: 'and once on her father's shores Evenus' daughter caused discord between Idas and lovelorn Phoebus'). Tibullus gives much more space to this aspect of Apollo in 2.3.11–36 (discussed above), where he relates the story of the god's love for Admetus. We might think that Ovid has rather missed a trick here: if his project is to undermine the god's authority, why does he not take his cue from Tibullus' irreverent version of Apollo in love and produce another undignified picture of the tousled cowherd? Perhaps it is surprising that Ovid chooses not to do this, but it is worth noting that, a little later on in his elegiac career, he reminds the reader of Tibullus' story. In the second book of the *Ars Amatoria*, the myth of Apollo and Admetus is briefly mentioned: *Cynthia Admeti uaccas pauce Phraei / fertur et in parua delituisse casa* ('Apollo is said to have pastured Phraean Admetus' cows, and to have lurked in a little hut', *Ars* 2.239–40). Through *fertur*, the poet hints back to other renditions of the tale, and the echo in *parua . . . casa* of Tibullus 2.3.28<sup>44</sup> confirms that *his* is the version to which we are being directed. Ovid does not *have* to go to the effort of ridiculing Apollo: Tibullus has already done so, and these lines of the *Ars* neatly, economically bring that back into our minds. A further twist of the knife comes when the *praeceptor amoris* goes on to say, *quod Phoebus decuit, quem non decet?* (broadly, 'if it was good enough for Phoebus, it's good enough for you', 241); not content with leaving Apollo as the

<sup>42</sup> The phrase *ille ego* may also recall the alternative opening to the *Aeneid*, *Ille ego, qui quondam gracili modulatus auena / carmen . . .* ('I am he who once played my song on a slender reed . . .'). This, though presumably not Virgilian, appears to have been a very early addition to some texts. See A. Barchiesi, *Speaking Volumes: Narrative and Intertext in Ovid and other Latin Poets* (London, 2001), 160–1 for the significance of its use in the *Amores*.

<sup>43</sup> There seem to be Callimachean overtones in the opening section of *Odes* 3.1, via the rejection of mass opinion (*odi profanum uulgus et arceo*, 'I hate the uninitiated crowd and keep them away', 1); this interpretation is no doubt behind Propertius' openly Callimachean elegy 3.1, where he too terms himself a poetic *sacerdos* (3.1.3). See Lyne (n. 18) 184–5 for the political resonance of the word *sacerdos* in Horace.

<sup>44</sup> Noted by Murgatroyd (n. 37) *ad* Tib. 2.3.28 and by M. Janka, *Ovid Ars Amatoria Buch 2 Kommentar* (Heidelberg, 1997) *ad* *Ars* 2.239–42, who also mentions the half-echo of Tibullus' *pauit . . . tauros* (2.3.11) in *uaccas pauce* (*Ars* 2.239). Janka also quotes [Tib.] 3.4.67–8, where Apollo says, *me quondam Admeti niueas pauce iuencas / non est in uanum fabula ficta iocum* ('it is not a story made up for an idle joke that I once pastured Admetus' snow-white heifers'). Ovid also refers to the story of Apollo and Admetus at *Heroides* 5.151–2 (lines, as it happens, condemned by Merk).

parallel for the degradation of one love poet, Tibullus, Ovid here makes the god the model for all lovers' acts of self-abasement.

Staying for the moment with the idea of Apollo as a *seruus amoris* ('slave of love'), I wonder if back in the *Amores* there might be a sly hint of the god playing this role with Ovid as the object of his desires at 1.15.35–6: *mihi flauus Apollo / pocula Castalia plena ministret aqua* ('let blond Apollo pour me cups full of Castalian water'). The primary import of these lines is poetical: Apollo as one kind of poetic source is combined with the liquid source, Castalia, a spring on Mount Parnassus, sacred to Apollo and the Muses, whose waters represent poetic inspiration.<sup>45</sup> For the moment, however, I am rather more interested in the verb, *ministret*. As Barsby notes, the idea of Apollo serving Ovid as a kind of waiter 'adds a touch of impudent novelty',<sup>46</sup> and reverses the more normal order where a mortal ministers to a deity.<sup>47</sup> This may be impudence enough, but I wonder if we could even take it a step further: given the emphasis on Apollo's good looks (cf. *flauus*, 'blond', a marker of a handsome man or woman), might we be tempted to think of a more famous divine servitor, Ganymede, the beautiful young Trojan who was plucked from the hills by a lovelorn Jupiter? Is Apollo being Ovid's Ganymede, pouring the Castalian waters of inspiration, rather than the usual wine or nectar, and thus providing a service with an erotic as well as poetic tinge?<sup>48</sup>

Whether or not it is possible to see Ganymede in Apollo at the end of *Amores* Book 1, the broader point of Ovid's poetic superiority to the god is made clear. It is at the start of the *Ars Amatoria* that we find Ovid distancing himself from Apollo most explicitly:

non ego, Phoebe, datas a te mentiar artes,  
nec nos aeriae uoce monemur auis,  
nec mihi sunt uisae Clio Cliusque sorores  
seruanti pecudes uallibus, Ascra, tuis;  
usus opus mouet hoc: uati parete perito;  
uera canam. coeptis, mater Amoris, ades

*Ars Amatoria* 1.25–30

I shall not lay false claim to arts given by you, Phoebus, nor am I warned by the call of birds in the sky, nor have I seen Clio and Clio's sisters, as I watched my flocks in your valleys, Ascra.

<sup>45</sup> See McKeown (n. 16) ad loc. for details. He also comments on the pun in Castalia on the Latin word *castus*, 'pure': the purity of poetic waters is their defining characteristic. (Compare Lucretius' *integros fontis*, 'untouched fountains' at *DRN* 1.927, and, via the probable founts of inspiration on Helicon in Callimachus, *Aetia* fr. 2, the pure springs which represent poetry in the *Hymn to Apollo*.) Alison Sharrock reminds me that in Propertius 3.3, where the poet also drinks from poetic springs, he merely touches the water to his lips (3.3.5 and 51–2: compare Callimachus' ὀλίγη λιβάς, *Hymn to Apollo*, 112), and does not get cups full of it, unlike Ovid! As J. A. Barsby, *Ovid Amores* 1 (Bristol, 1973) notes, however, it may be useful to compare Lucretius' poetic experience, where *iuuat integros accedere fontis / atque haurire* ('it is a joy to approach untouched fountains and drink them down', *DRN* 1.927–8).

<sup>46</sup> Barsby (n. 45), 163.

<sup>47</sup> McKeown (n. 16) ad loc. cites Grattius 99 and Statius *Siluae* 1.2.247–8 as examples of this 'proper' order where poets are the *ministri* of the Muses and Apollo.

<sup>48</sup> Adams (n. 22) notes that words connected with servility or obedience frequently carry a sexual *double entendre*, relating to 'the female or pathic side of the act' (163). It is easy to sense the sexual overtones of the verb in Ovid's account of the Ganymede story in *Metamorphoses* 10: his abduction by Jupiter is assigned specifically erotic motivation (*rex superum Phrygii quondam Ganymedis amore larsit*—'the king of the gods once burned with love for Phrygian Ganymede', 10.155–6), and he is later pictured serving his 'master': *qui [Ganymedes] nunc quoque pocula miscet / inuitaque Ioui nectar Iunone ministrat* ('now too he mixes drinks and, resented by Juno, serves nectar to Jupiter', 10.160–1).

Experience sets this work in motion: take heed of an experienced poet. I shall sing true things. Be at my side, mother of Love, as I begin.

Now experience, Ovid's experience, is heralded as the new inspiration. In these lines which pick up the assertions of independence made by the narrator of the *Amores* and also hark back to Propertius 2.1, the *praeceptor amoris* begins to spread his wings—no god (not even Amor) and no girl (contrast Propertius and *Amores* 2.1) has set *this* poem in motion. The Ovidian narrator is now pretty much independent.

There is much that is interesting and important about this passage and, as I mentioned at the start, it has already been the subject of several critical studies.<sup>49</sup> For the moment, suffice it to say that the poet displays supreme self-confidence in disavowing not only the inspiration of Callimachean Apollo, but also that of the Hesiodic Muses (themselves, it would appear, a further source of authority for Callimachus).<sup>50</sup>

Turning now to the opening of the second book of the *Ars*, another prime position for acknowledgement of divine inspiration, we are greeted with the poet's cry, *Dicite 'io Paeon' et 'io' bis dicite 'Paeon'* (2.1: 'Cry, "Io Paeon", and cry "Io Paeon" again'). This might at first seem to be an unambiguous invocation of Apollo, in his manifestation as the god of healing. But is this a true praise song of Apollo? Not a bit of it. Ovid is just using 'Paeon' as a generic term for a song of triumph, since *decidit in casses praeda petita meos* (2.2: 'the prey I sought has fallen into my nets').<sup>51</sup> The poet then trumpets his success, claims to be better than Hesiod and Homer,<sup>52</sup> and invokes Venus, Amor, and the Muse Erato: *nunc mihi, si quando, puer et Cytherea, fauete, I nunc Erato, nam tu nomen Amoris habes* (2.15–16: 'now, if ever, boy Cupid and Cytherea, favour me, now Erato, for you have the name of Love').<sup>53</sup> The three gods named here earlier appeared in the prologue to Book 1 (with the slight variation that the multiple Muses, named there as Clio and her sisters, have here been replaced with a single Muse, Erato). But in Book 1, a fourth deity—Apollo—is mentioned. Here, there is no sign of the god of poetry. Indeed, the god is doubly absent from the opening of Book 2, and his absence is twice signposted, first in the cry of Paeon, which turns out to be non-Apolline, and then in the 'omission' of his name from the list of inspirational gods. To restate the point: Apollo is first rejected in the disavowal of divine inspiration of Book 1 and is then written out of the subsequent call for divine assistance in Book 2. Significantly, despite his assertion of independence in the first book, the poet does not balk at invoking other divinities to assist him in his project at the opening of Book 2. Indeed,

<sup>49</sup> See note 1 for bibliography on this passage.

<sup>50</sup> The Muses are placed in the valleys of Ascræ, Hesiod's birthplace, in an obvious reference to that poet's 'initiation scene' at *Theogony* 22–35; Callimachus quotes the Hesiodic scene in *Aetia* fr. 2.

<sup>51</sup> So too Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 227 and 258–9.

<sup>52</sup> *laetus amans donat uiridi mea carmina palma I praelata Ascræo Maeonioque seni* (*Ars* 2.3–4: 'let the happy lover crown my songs with the victory palm taken over from the old men of Ascræ [Hesiod] and Maeonia [Homer]'). The poet here outdoes even the startling arrogance of Book 1.

<sup>53</sup> For present purposes, I am taking the *praeceptor's* claims to success pretty much at face value. His use of Paris and Pelops as paradigms for amatory (and, by implication, poetic) success at lines 5–8, however, has to ring a note of caution. Paris' 'success' with Helen led to the Trojan War and his own death; Pelops won Hippodamia's hand by treacherous means, and his family was not the happiest. Whether such ironies are to be viewed as the undermining of the *praeceptor* persona by the knowing figure of the 'real' Ovid, or are placed there by the *praeceptor* himself as a test for his more intelligent students is an interesting issue which I do not have time to discuss here.

even in Book 1, after his disavowal of divine inspiration, the *praeceptor* hopes that Venus will be there to help him: *coeptis, mater Amoris, ades* ('be at my side, mother of Love, as I begin', 35).<sup>54</sup> Admittedly, given the self-confident tone of the surrounding passages in both books, it is easy to view this call to the Muse and love gods more as an assumption of divine approval of the sublime poet's work than a request for help.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, it seems significant that the poet does not allow Apollo to creep back into the inspirational role denied him in Book 1, while such a return is allowed to the Muses and Cupid, and is reasserted for Venus.

A little further on, in the Daedalus episode at the start of Book 2, Apollo is absent yet again. The poet makes no mention of the temple Daedalus is said to have dedicated to Apollo at Cumae, familiar to the reader from the opening of *Aeneid* 6.<sup>56</sup> This is no careless omission: the phrase *remigium uolucrum* ('oars of birds' feathers'), used at *Ars* 2.45, is a clear verbal reminder of *remigium alarum* ('oars of wings') used by Virgil at *Aeneid* 6.19, also to describe Daedalus' wings, which he dedicates to Apollo in thanks for his successful crossing of the seas.<sup>57</sup> Ovid is omitting a story that has already been told while reminding us of the existence of that story. Given that it is very tempting to draw an analogy between the figure of the artist Daedalus and the poet of the *Ars*,<sup>58</sup> the absence of Apollo and his temple from Ovid's version of the Daedalus story could easily be argued to function (at least in part) as yet another distancing of the *praeceptor* from the god of poetry. This Ovidian Daedalus, unlike the Virgilian, feels there is no need or reason to build a temple to thank Apollo for his success, since that success is due to his own ingenuity alone; similarly, perhaps, the poet himself need not falsely thank Apollo for help which was neither needed nor received.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Miller (n. 1, 1983) sees the invocation of Venus as an undercutting of the elaborate parody that goes before, and takes the epiphany of Apollo in *Ars* 2 to be a more striking version of the same joke. While I do not deny that there may well be a play here with authorial inconsistency, it seems to me that the effect of the invocation of Venus and, in particular of the epiphany of Apollo (discussed in more detail below) is more complex than a simple contradiction.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Gibson (n. 35), 104 and 109–10 on the poet's relationship with Venus as inspiring goddess.

<sup>56</sup> For a full-length discussion of the relationship between the *Aeneid* and *Ars Amatoria* here, see Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 104–11. It should also be noted that the omission of the temple could have a political edge to it as well: Apollo's Cumae temple in Virgil is in some ways a precursor (or at least a reminder) of the temple of Apollo on the Palatine. Indeed, when praying before the temple built by Daedalus, Aeneas promises the god that there will in future be a temple and games dedicated to him at Rome (*Aeneid* 6.69–70).

<sup>57</sup> This is a phrase with a distinguished history, starting in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, 52, *περὶ γῶν ἐρετμοῖσιν* (where the Atreidae are compared to vultures grieving for their lost young—a link can be made with Daedalus, who loses his son), and brought into Latin by Lucretius at *DRN* 6.743, *remigi . . . pennarum* (talking about the toxic effect on birds of vapours rising from volcanic lakes like Avernus—Avernus being very close to Cumae where Daedalus landed).

<sup>58</sup> As do C. F. Ahern, 'Daedalus and Icarus in the *Ars Amatoria*', *HSCP* 85 (1989), 44–8 and Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), ch. 3. Compare M. C. J. Putnam, 'Daedalus, Vergil and the end of art', *AJP* 108 (1987), 173–98, who offers a similar interpretation of the Daedalus digression in the *Aeneid*.

<sup>59</sup> There is a more positive, if brief, coupling of Apollo and poetry at *Ars* 3.347, where, having listed the poets that girls should make sure to know, the *praeceptor* adds his own works to the list and voices his hopes for fame, calling on Apollo, Bacchus, and the Muses to grant his wish. This constellation of divine powers associated with poetry recalls that of *Amores* 1.3.11 (discussed above), but I have to admit that I cannot see much evidence of the undermining of the god here. The very conventionality of this triad (see n. 40) may, however, argue against any particular significance in Apollo's presence here.

But then a little further on in *Ars* 2, Apollo appears to resume his traditional role of telling the poet what to do:

haec ego cum canerem, subito manifestus Apollo  
 mouit inauratae pollice fila lyrae.  
 in manibus laurus, sacris induta capillis  
 laurus erat: uates ille uidendus adit.  
 is mihi 'lasciui' dixit 'praeceptor Amoris,  
 duc age discipulos ad mea templa tuos,  
 est ubi diuersum fama celebrata per orbem  
 littera, cognosci quae sibi quemque iubet.  
 qui sibi notus erit, solus sapienter amabit  
 atque opus ad uires exiget omne suas.  
 cui faciem natura dedit, spectetur ab illa;  
 cui color est, umero saepe patente cubet;  
 qui sermone placet, taciturna silentia uitet;  
 qui canit arte, canat; qui bibit arte, bibat.  
 sed neque declament medio sermone diserti  
 nec sua non sanus scripta poeta legat.'<sup>60</sup>  
 sic monuit Phoebus: Phoebos parete monenti;  
 certa dei sacro est huius in ore fides.

*Ars Amatoria* 2. 493–510

While I was singing this, Apollo suddenly appeared and plucked the string of his golden lyre with his thumb. He had a laurel branch in his hand, and a holy laurel wreath was laid on his hair: that poet/prophet was there to be seen. He said to me, 'Teacher of naughty Love, come, lead your pupils to my temple, where there are the words known, famous through the remote world, which order everyone to know himself. He who knows himself is the only one who will love wisely, and will carry out every task according to his own his strengths. Let him to whom nature gave good looks be noticed for them; he who has a tan should always recline with his shoulder on show; he who pleases with his speech should avoid mute silence; he who sings with skill should sing, who drinks with skill should drink. Let the witty not make a speech in the middle of their story, nor should a mad poet read his own work.' So Phoebus warned: obey Phoebus as he warns you. The truth is sure in the sacred mouth of this god.

The image of the god interrupting the poet to give him instructions must immediately bring the familiar Callimachean situation (discussed above) to mind. Some critics see this as a humorous self-contradiction from the poet who had boasted of his independence from the god in book 1 of the *Ars*.<sup>60</sup> The advice Apollo gives, though, is, at least on the surface, amatory and not poetic.<sup>61</sup> The injunction for each man to

<sup>60</sup> E.g. Miller (n. 1, 1983). S. Casali, 'Apollo, Ovid and the foreknowledge of criticism (*Ars* 2.493–512)', *CJ* 93.1 (1997), 19–27, argues that the self-contradiction is put there as a trap for the reader in a deliberate attempt by the poet to create interesting 'problems' to be discussed by commentators.

<sup>61</sup> Miller (n. 1, 1983) notes this too, and regards this new information-bearing Apollo as a version of the Callimachean Apollo of *Aetia* fr. 114, who tells the poet about his cult at Delos. However, an important difference, which Miller notes but does not seem to regard as problematic, is the fact that Ovid's Apollo tells him the sort of thing that he has already demonstrated that he knows perfectly well himself. Casali (n. 60) points out (rightly, to my mind) that the poetic side to Apollo's intervention also has a slightly different function from that suggested by Miller: this is no straightforwardly Callimachean intervention by the god, diverting the poet from the pseudo-cosmogony of *Ars* 2.467–92. Why, after all, would the Apollo who supported the production of the song of Silenus in *Eclogue* 6 object to some philosophical colouring in the *Ars Amatoria*? Casali's contention is that it is the appearance of Apollo himself which is the out of place element in this section of the *Ars*, and the result is a pleasing paradox whereby the epiphany of the god who usually redirects erring poets in itself constitutes digression. If this argument is accepted, it could be seen to support my own thesis of the general downgrading of Apollo: once again, the god in Callimachean guise is robbed of his power to influence Ovid's work, and is even shown to be superfluous.

know himself, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, is the motto famously carved on Apollo's temple in Delphi, so the following advice is duly characterized as Apolline, and even imbued with the wisdom of ages. Its very familiarity, though, can make it seem blindingly obvious: the instruction to make the most of your good points seems far from revolutionary.<sup>62</sup> It has to be admitted that the *praeceptor* has not yet, as it happens, put this point quite so bluntly.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, the specific instructions offered by the god seem to rehash and even simplify advice the poet has already given. Show off a nice tan, he says (2.504), a rule already stated at *Ars* 1.513;<sup>64</sup> let the eloquent, the musical, and the practised drinkers make the most of that (2.505–6: compare 2.123–4 [on the uses of eloquence] and 1.565–6 [on drinking sensibly and to erotic advantage]); do not start declaiming instead of being attractively eloquent (2.507: cf. 1.465).<sup>65</sup> The god can offer no suggestion that has not been made before. Moreover,

<sup>62</sup> E. Downing, *Artificial I's: The Self as Artwork in Ovid, Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann* (Tübingen, 1993), 54 reads Apollo's message differently, and sees in it a contrast between Apollo's advice to the student to rely on natural gifts already present, and the *praeceptor's* insistence on artificiality and the construction of the self. Perhaps, but I am not sure that the distinction between the natural and the contrived is as stark as all that.

<sup>63</sup> The poet-lover of the *Amores* has already lamented the fact that Corinna knows herself all too well: *me miserum! cur est tam bene nota sibi? I scilicet a speculi sumuntur imagine fastus, I nec nisi compositam se prius illa uidet* ('alas! Why is she so well known to herself? No doubt her disdain is picked up from her image in the mirror, and she never looks at herself unless she has been made-up first'; *Amores* 2.17.8–10). It is in *Ars Amatoria* 3 that the poet adopts the injunction 'know thyself' (cf. 3.261–80 and 3.771–88: note in particular 771, *nota sibi sit quaeque* 'let each woman be known to herself'). The anonymous referee suggests that the fact that the overt recapitulation of the advice to know your own good points appears only in the third book of the *Ars* could show that the poet has indeed learned from the god. Well, perhaps he has. But I would offer the following modifications to such an argument: first, the passage at 3.771–88 offers examples of how a woman can display herself to her best advantage during sex. Here the poet improves on what he has been taught by spicing it up, even burlesquing it. By applying the commonplace 'know thyself' to one of the more risqué sections of the poem, he revitalizes that commonplace: something, I would argue, that Apollo conspicuously fails to do in his epiphany in Book 2. Secondly, the *praeceptor* has, in any case, long admitted that women fall into very different types: e.g. 1.755–6: *finiturus eram, sed sunt diuersa puellis I pectora; mille animos excipe mille modis* ('I was going to finish, but girls' hearts are different; you must catch a thousand minds in a thousand ways'). Whereas men are mostly seen as a more homogeneous bunch, or at least able to mould themselves into the single, archetypal figure of the elegiac lover, women are supposed to be different, and their differences are to be celebrated, both by themselves and by the men who gain pleasure from tracking different kinds of prey. Hence, although the injunction 'know thyself' appears to appeal to the girls' individuality, the following advice makes it clear that women in fact divide into types: tall, short, fat, thin, and so on. To put it more simply, Ovid applies (and distorts) the commonplace Apolline insistence on self-knowledge in *Ars* 3 only because it fits into his already established view of women as divisible into types with correspondingly more and less attractive qualities. Cf. Gibson (n. 35) *ad* 3.771–2, who observes that 'know thyself' is in the *Ars* insistently (and over simplistically) applied to physical qualities, rather than to deeper knowledge of one's own soul.

<sup>64</sup> The idea that men look more attractive if their skin has been tanned by the sun while they exercise is apparently contradicted at *Ars* 1.729–30, where lovers are advised to look pale. I think, though, that the two statements refer to different stages of the courting process: let a woman first see you looking tanned and manly, and then see how pale your love for her has made you. Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 251–2 suggests that, while the *praeceptor's* earlier instructions warn men not to overdo any attention to their physical appearance, Apollo's instruction to bare the shoulder smacks of Greek effeminacy rather than muscular Roman healthiness.

<sup>65</sup> As Casali (n. 60), 24 remarks, these two lines offer the only examples of the use of *declamo* in Ovid, and thus cry out to be connected. I see the earlier line as evidence that the poet does not need Apollo's advice. Casali, more fair-mindedly, puts forward two alternatives: either Apollo's advice is redundant or the poet was lying in the proem to the *Ars* when he claimed that the god did not inspire him.

he starts by telling the good-looking to trade on their looks (2.503). This is all very well, and natural, but it should be noted that the *praeceptor* himself earlier on in Book 2 has warned against putting too much faith in one's own beauty!<sup>66</sup> Lines 107–44 offer a compelling argument that good looks are not enough to keep a girl's love; indeed, wit and intelligence can even serve as powerful and longer lasting alternatives to beauty, as in the case of Ulysses, who was not handsome but was eloquent, and so won the love of Calypso. Apollo's advice thus seems rather thin by contrast with the poet's more nuanced approach.

Another difference between the advice of Apollo and of the *praeceptor* can be found in the final line, where the god urges that a mad poet should not read out his own writings (2.508).<sup>67</sup> This comes after the assertion (also made by the poet at 1.465) that to cross the line between witty eloquence and overbearing speechifying is not a good idea. Equally, then, the god argues, a poet should not bore women with his latest work. Now this is a proposition with which it seems the *praeceptor* would be harder pushed to agree, though perhaps he should. The poet is often driven to lament the fact that poetry has less effect on women than he believes it ought to, since more tangible, expensive gifts are usually preferred to poems (cf. *Ars* 2.273–80; see also *Amores* 1.10, 3.8; *Ars* 3.551–2). Apollo, it seems, has accepted the fact that reciting verse is *not* the way to a woman's heart. Such a pragmatic reaction no doubt fits well with the down-to-earth advice that young men should know their own limits (the obvious flip-side of the idea that they should know their own strengths). However, is it an attitude one expects, let alone approves, in the god of poetry himself?<sup>68</sup>

Moreover, the last line of Apollo's speech is immediately followed by the injunction, *Phoebo parete monenti* (2.509: 'obey Phoebus as he warns you'), which recalls Ovid's self-assertive *uati parete perito* at 1.29 ('obey the experienced poet'). This could go either way, but it seems to me that, given the less than profound advice Apollo offers here, and given the fact that the phrase about obeying the poet is echoed from the passage in Book 1 where Ovid explicitly rejected Phoebus' influence, the reminiscence only serves to undermine the god further. Apollo has demonstrated that he has little, if anything, new to offer either to the poet or to the novice lover, and the *praeceptor's* order to obey his instruction becomes tinged with sarcasm. Note, in addition, that in addressing the poet as *lasciui* . . . *praeceptor Amoris* ('teacher of naughty Love', 2.497), Apollo reminds the reader again of that other piece of divine domination in the opening of Book 1, immediately preceding the rejection of Apollo, when the poet claims to be the teacher and tamer of Amor (1.3–24).<sup>69</sup> The god, allowed a little more

<sup>66</sup> Compare also the briefer, but still pointed, comment at *Ars* 1.707–8: *a, nimia est iuueni propriae fiducia formae, l expectat si quis dum prior illa roget!* ('ah, the young man has too much faith in his own beauty who waits for the girl to proposition him first!').

<sup>67</sup> The poet is described as *non sanus*, which can mean both 'mad' and 'not well'. Poets are frequently regarded as, in some sense, insane (e.g. Horace, *Epistles* 1.19.3–4), but there is a play here, too, with the idea of the poet being lovesick. The line also picks up the parallel passage on not declaiming to one's girlfriend, where one who does so is defined as *mentis inops* ('soft in the head', 1.465): cf. Janka (n. 44) ad loc.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Janka (n. 44) ad loc. Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 254 argues that Apollo is in fact distinguishing here between two types of poet: the 'insane' poet, who relies on inspiration, *ingenium*, and the 'sane', Callimachean poet, whose work rests not on inspiration but on *ars*. In this way, she rescues Apollo from the apparently paradoxical situation of rejecting the very sphere of life he is supposed to represent. I think that the line does indeed support this interpretation, but simultaneously proffers the more subversive suggestion that Apollo is neither well suited nor even committed to being an effective patron of poets.

<sup>69</sup> And see my argument earlier that one might see hints of the poet's burgeoning self-assurance even in the face of Cupid's poetic dictatorship in *Amores* 1.1–3.

attention and influence in this poem than in the *Amores*, still shows himself to be infinitely less sophisticated than the poet himself. Or, as Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 229 puts it, 'Ovid's claim might be dramatised thus: "I am the Apollo of this work; it is I who hold the keys of wisdom, poetic and erotic"'.<sup>70</sup>

As if to confirm this interpretation once and for all, in the closing stages of *Ars Amatoria* 3 the *praeceptor* boasts:

sed neque Phoebei tripodes nec corniger Ammon  
uera magis uobis quam mea Musa canet;  
si qua fides, arti, quam longo fecimus usu,  
credite: praestabunt carmina nostra fidem. *Ars Amatoria* 3.789–92

But neither the tripods of Phoebus nor horned Ammon will sing more truth to you than my Muse; if you have any faith, trust my art which I have made through long experience: my songs will show my trustworthiness.

Although, as ever, there is plenty of irony in the poet's injunction 'trust my art', when he himself has shown us that his art is fundamentally deceptive, the rejection of the superstitious reliance on the oracles of Apollo and Ammon is clear.<sup>71</sup> In a move which prefigures the overtly rational stance of the *Remedia Amoris* (more on which soon), Ovid not only distances himself from the mystical figure of Apollo the oracle, as seen in *Ars Amatoria* 2, but also, once again, from Apollo the patron god of poetry. The Muse here is Ovid's poetry, Ovid's wisdom, based on Ovid's experience. We are referred yet again to the assertion of Book 1, *usus opus mouet hoc* ('experience sets this work in motion', 1.29).<sup>72</sup>

So, while there is undoubtedly a certain degree of self-contradiction between Ovid's outright rejection of Apollo at the start of the *Ars*, and his apparent tolerance of the god's intervention in Book 2, it is still possible to see a continuity of sorts in the poet's explicit or implicit contention that, as far as he is concerned, Apollo is at best peripheral and at worst redundant. However, the situation really seems to change in the *Remedia Amoris*, where Apollo stages a come-back, and is named eight times in 814 lines.<sup>73</sup> Perhaps this is only fitting—this is, after all, a poem which claims to be about undoing what Ovid has done before: *Naso legendus erat tum cum didicistis amare; / idem nunc uobis Naso legendus erit* (*Remedia Amoris* 71–2: 'You read Naso then, when you learned how to love; now the same Naso is to be read by you').<sup>74</sup> Accordingly, Ovid

<sup>70</sup> Sharrock (n. 1, 1994) devotes a whole chapter of her book to this episode in *Ars Amatoria* 2, and I direct the reader to her discussion (197–290), which is far fuller and more nuanced than I have the space for here.

<sup>71</sup> Here he self-consciously echoes similar Lucretian claims: cf. Lucretius, *DRN* 5.110–12. Also noted by Sharrock (n. 1, 1994), 227 and Gibson (n. 35) *ad loc.*

<sup>72</sup> And to the emphasis on the truthfulness offered by Ovid's verse at *Ars* 1.30. Here he presents a refined version of Hesiod's Muses, who knew how to sing both truth and falsehood (*Theogony* 27–8). Cf. Gibson (n. 35) *ad* 3.790 and Miller (n. 1, 1983), 29 on the passage in *Ars* 1.

<sup>73</sup> As Apollo: *Rem. Am.* 251, 489, 767; as Phoebus: 76, 200, 704, 705, 706. (At 256 and 585, Phoebus is the Sun: see J. E. Fontenrose, 'Apollo and the Sun God in Ovid', *AJPh* 61 [1940], 429–44 for a convincing argument that Ovid does not confuse the two.)

<sup>74</sup> Of course, as many critics have observed, this pose of 'reversal' in the *Remedia* is in many ways an insufficient (and self-consciously insufficient) characterization of the work. See, for example, G. B. Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation* (Ithaca, New York, 1994), ch. 2; K. Volk, *The Poetics of Latin Didactic* (Oxford, 2002), 171ff. (who argues that the *Ars* and *Remedia* deal with different kinds of *amor*); P. A. Watson, 'Praecepta Amoris: Ovid's didactic elegy', in B. W. Boyd (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Ovid* (Leiden, 2002), 141–65.



invokes Apollo's help, now involving the god he had earlier more or less studiously ignored:

te precor incipiens; adsit tua laurea nobis,  
carminis et medicae Phoebe repertor opis;  
tu pariter uati, pariter succurre medenti:  
utraque tutelae subdita cura tuae est.

*Remedia Amoris* 75–8

I pray to you as I start; may your laurel be with me, and you, Phoebus, inventor of poetry and medical aid. Come equally to help a poet and equally to help one who cures: each concern comes under your guardianship.

In this work, the god represents a rational, enlightened approach to curing lovesickness: try magic if you want, says the poet, but, *noster Apollo / innocuam sacro carmine monstrat opem* (251–2: 'my Apollo shows a harmless cure through sacred song'). Apollo's is a force no longer to be resented, resisted or ignored, it seems, but rather welcomed.

The force of Apollo's presence here is not just that of contradiction and reversal. He is not foregrounded in the *Remedia Amoris* simply because he was side-lined in the *Ars Amatoria*: that is a reason, but not the only one. The Apollo of the *Remedia* is rather different from the Apollo of the *Ars*. In the earlier poem he is the (undervalued, rejected) god of poetry and prophecy, while in the *Remedia* he is pictured as a different figure, Apollo Medicus. Here the god is a healer, the inventor of medicine. Importantly, this Apollo is not only different from the more familiar god of Augustan literature who acts as poetic patron and guarantor of military success, but also older. The worship of Apollo was instituted at Rome in the 430s B.C. following a plague.<sup>75</sup> The god's first temple at Rome was dedicated to Apollo in his manifestation as a healer: the first and, indeed, the only temple until the building of Augustus' Palatine temple to the god four centuries later.<sup>76</sup> Apollo's long-standing function in the city was that of a healing god, not a poet or a warrior. The original temple had been dedicated by Cn. Julius (consul in 431 B.C.), but at some point in the years between Naulochus and Actium it was rebuilt by C. Sosius,<sup>77</sup> an Antonian sympathizer who was to be one of his principal admirals at Actium.<sup>78</sup> It was known to later generations as the temple of Apollo Sosianus.<sup>79</sup> This temple was, in short, different and separate from the Augustan foundation on the Palatine. Ovid's introduction of an Apollo Medicus in the *Remedia Amoris*, therefore, not only reminds us that Apollo has functions other than those trumpeted by the Augustan orthodoxy, but even reminds us of the god's association with another man, Sosius. Augustus need not be embarrassed by Apollo's connection with healing, and perhaps he need not be insulted even by his association with a once

<sup>75</sup> The temple was vowed in 433 and consecrated in 431, and repeatedly renewed: Livy 4.25.3, 29.7. Cf. K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, (Munich, 1960), 222–3 and G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*<sup>2</sup> (Munich, 1912), 293–5. Thanks to Oliver Lyne for these references.

<sup>76</sup> Asconius 90.4 (in A. C. Clark's 1907 *OCT*).

<sup>77</sup> Sosius held a triumph in 34 B.C. and was consul in 32, so it seems plausible that the refurbishment of the temple might have taken place around that time. Some argue for a later date, but see Gurval (n. 4), 116–17 for a detailed set of reasons why this makes less sense.

<sup>78</sup> After the battle, Sosius was spared by Augustus and retained some political standing. Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), 349.

<sup>79</sup> E.g. Pliny *Nat.* 36.28. No doubt this was how the temple was commonly known after its Sosian renovation.

prominent Antonian,<sup>80</sup> but he need not be pleased either by this bypassing of the integrated Apolline imagery of his reign.

The situation is a little more complicated than this, however. Apollo's function as healer is emphasized in the *Remedia*, and this emphasis is, as I have argued, of great importance. Yet even so, one cannot help feeling that Ovid could easily have made more of Apollo's medicinal powers. Apollo's character in this area, after all, has much in common with that of the *praeceptor*: Apollo is the god who with his bow and arrows can both kill and cure.<sup>81</sup> We might remember in particular that the archer-god who sent the plague in *Iliad* 1 is the same Apollo who cures Glaucus of his arrow wound in *Iliad* 16. This might have been a perfect story to illustrate the affinity of the god with the poet of the *Remedia Amoris*, but it is a story that Ovid chooses not to tell. He opts instead for the human-focused myth of Telephus' wounding at the hands of Achilles, subsequently cured by a dose of the rust from Achilles' spear.<sup>82</sup> More importantly, perhaps, Ovid neither calls Apollo 'Paeon' nor makes the ritual cry 'Hie Paeon'.<sup>83</sup> His use of the cry to support his own claims for the success of his poetry back in *Ars Amatoria* 2 (discussed above) rings out in stark contrast.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there does seem to be a difference in Ovid's treatment of Apollo in the *Remedia Amoris*. Most significantly (and somewhat inconveniently for my argument!), the poet grants the god another epiphany towards the end of the poem:

consilium est, quodcumque cano: parete canenti,  
utque facis, coeptis, Phoebe saluber, ades.  
Phoebus adest: sonuere lyrae, sonuere pharetrae;  
signa deum nosco per sua: Phoebus adest. *Remedia Amoris* 703–6

This is my counsel, whatever I sing. You all should obey the singer, and you, Health-Bringer Phoebus, as you act [that is, heal], be with my undertaking. Phoebus is here: the lyres and quivers have sounded. I recognize the god by his own signs: Phoebus is here.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. B. Kellum, 'Concealing/revealing: gender and the play of meaning in the monuments of Augustan Rome', in T. Habinek and A. Sciesaro (edd.), *The Roman Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, 1997), 158–81. She argues (161–3) that the temple manages to honour both Sosius and Augustus, since it took the former's name, but was dedicated on the latter's birthday, 23 September. Her thesis is based in part on E. La Rocca, *Amazzonomachia. Le sculture frontonali del tempio di Apollo Sosiano* (Rome, 1985), and both argue for an interpretation of the Amazonomachy depicted on the temple as a celebration of the victory over Cleopatra at Actium. Gurval (n. 4), 116–17 rejects the idea as put forward by La Rocca, supporting an earlier date for the refurbishment, and adding that it was not unusual for the official dates of a temple's dedication to have been changed later in order to fit in with the Augustan calendar. Clearly, it is Gurval's interpretation which better supports my own argument.

<sup>81</sup> F. Càssola, *Inni Omerici* (Verona, 1975), 81 notes that in cult, Apollo is armed with bow and arrows in his manifestations as both doctor (at Apollonia Pontica) and warder-off of evil (at Athens and Selinus); in imperial Roman times, statues were raised to Apollo the archer at Hierapolis and Callipolis that he might ward off plague.

<sup>82</sup> *Remedia Amoris* 47–8. According to Hyginus, *Fabula* 101 and Apollodorus, *Epitome* 3.20, it is Apollo who tells Telephus where to find his cure. Ovid does not mention this: another (intentionally) missed opportunity? It must, of course, be acknowledged that Ovid has other fish to fry here as well: his work contradicts Propertius' assertion, *omnis humanos sanat medicina dolores: l' solus amor morbi non amat artificem* ('medicine cures all human ills: only love does not love the doctor of its disease', 2.1.57–8), using one of the examples used to back up Propertius' argument (2.1.63–4) to support his own.

<sup>83</sup> Here it is useful to bear in mind Macrobius' comment that the Vestal Virgins appealed to *Apollo Medice*, *Apollo Paeon* (1.17.15). Ovid clearly brings Apollo Medicus to mind at *Remedia Amoris* 76 (*medicae Phoebe repertor opis*), but, as it were, misses out the second half of the ritual cry, Paeon. Thanks to Oliver Lyne for bringing Macrobius to my attention.

The advent of the god is presented in a straightforward way, which might call to mind any number of poetic epiphanies. Given that this is Apollo, though, perhaps we might remember the start of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo, or fr. 227.1 Pf.: 'Ἐνεστ' Ἀπόλλων τῷ χορῷ· τῆς λύρης ἀκούω ('Apollo is at the dance; I hear the lyre').<sup>84</sup> In accordance with the poet's project of bringing rationality to bear on love,<sup>85</sup> he here introduces sensible advice (*consilium*) which works as a cure for love and overturns the romantic Propertian stance of *nullo uiuere consilio* ('to live without any plan', 1.1.6).<sup>86</sup> Apollo, in healing mode, as promoter of sound mind as well as sound body,<sup>87</sup> is assumed to have much in common with the Ovidian healer's view on the matter, and thus can be invoked as a likely supporter of the cause.

So Apollo is allowed his influence here, but it is, I would argue, a carefully circumscribed influence. The god is asked to support the poet's argument, and is not presented as dictating or inspiring it. The line-ending of 703, *parete canenti* ('obey the singer'), recalls, if in slightly watered-down form, the injunction at the start of *Ars Amatoria* 1 to obey the experienced poet who has no need of Apollo, as well as the order to obey Apollo at the end of his other epiphany in *Ars Amatoria* 2 (see the discussion above). While the *praeceptor* is emphatically presented as a poet as well as a healer, Apollo is specifically invoked as Healer. It is in this context, it seems, that we are encouraged to interpret the conventional description of the god's lyre and quiver ringing out to advertise his presence. These quivers represent a different kind of archery from that of Cupid, and thus form the antidote to the weapons of Love.<sup>88</sup> Yet only a few lines previously (609–72), the poet has renewed his assertion that the *Remedia* is not really an attack on Cupid, and has promised not to disarm Cupid or make him any less potent.<sup>89</sup> If Apollo is to be Ovid's ally in the War on Love, one hopes

<sup>84</sup> Cf. C. Lucke, *P. Ovidius Naso: Remedia Amoris. Kommentar zu Vers 397–814* (Bonn, 1982), ad loc., who sees the resemblance as parodic.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. the verdict on the *Ars Amatoria* offered at the start of the *Remedia Amoris: quod nunc ratio est, impetus ante fuit* ('what is now rational was impulse before', 10). As A. A. R. Henderson, *Ovid: Remedia Amoris* (Edinburgh, 1979) notes ad loc., the terms here recall the technical vocabulary of Stoic ethics, which made a virtue of the suppression of animal instincts and the elevation of reason.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Henderson (n. 85) xv–xvi, who argues that the outline of the whole programme of the *Remedia* is suggested by Propertius 1.1. This view may be supported by the argument of Gibson (n. 35), 24 that the pro-cosmetic stance of *Ars* 3 emerges in reaction to the rejection of such things in Propertius 1.2.

<sup>87</sup> Apollo as god of prophecy is associated with revelation and understanding, and his well-ordered lyre music contrasts with the chaotic flutes and drums of Dionysus and Cybele, which puts him on the side of order and rationality. (Although E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* [Berkeley, 1951], 68–70 emphasizes the ecstatic side of Apolline cult, and warns against accepting too readily Nietzsche's Apollo–Dionysus dichotomy.) Philosophers were often keen to ally themselves with the god (e.g. Plato, *Apology* 23b), and there were even anecdotes which claimed that Apollo was Plato's real father (cf. A. S. Riginos, *Platonica: the Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* [Leiden, 1976], 9–32).

<sup>88</sup> So P. Pinotti, *Remedia Amoris* (Bologna, 1988), 297. Compare the recommendation made earlier in the *Remedia* to choose military service as a remedy for love: *uince Cupidineas pariter Parthasque sagittas / et refer ad patrios bina tropaea deos* ('conquer Cupid's and the Parthians' arrows alike, and bring back a double trophy to your gods at home', 157–8).

<sup>89</sup> The opening scene of the *Remedia Amoris* offers a replay of the encounter between the poet and Cupid in *Amores* 1.1. There, as in the *Amores*, the god objects to the work the poet is about to begin. He sees it as a kind of war being waged against himself (in parallel and contrast to the warlike epic the poet attempts to compose before the *Amores* emerge instead). Unlike the previous encounter, however, this one results in Cupid being persuaded that the work envisaged by the poet

that he will indeed be able to adopt the same subtle approach as the *praeceptor*, who undermines and disarms Cupid even as he persuades him that he is doing no such thing. Looking forward to the famous clash of Apollo and Cupid in *Metamorphoses* 1, the omens are not encouraging.

Moreover, Apollo's epiphany could be argued to have taken place rather late in the day, long after the invocation of the god towards the start of the work.<sup>90</sup> Perhaps this can be explained by reference to another passage in the *Remedia*. In what some have seen to be a rather random digression at *Remedia* 361–96, the poet defends his work and rejects Envy.<sup>91</sup> There is much that is interesting about this section, but I will focus here on the closing lines:

rumpere, Liur edax: magnum iam nomen habemus:  
maius erit, tantum, quo pede coepit, eat.  
sed nimium properas: uiuam modo, plura dolebis,  
et capiunt anni carmina multa mei.  
nam iuuat et studium famae mihi creuit honore;  
principio cliui noster anhelat equus.  
tantum se nobis elegi debere fatentur,  
quantum Vergilio nobile debet epos. *Remedia Amoris* 389–96

Burst, biting Envy! I have a great name now, and it will be greater if it only goes along in the same tracks as it started.<sup>92</sup> You hurry too much: if I only live, you will regret it more, and my years will conceive many more songs. I find fame fun the more I find I'm famous; my horse is panting up the first slope. Elegy admits she owes as much to me as noble epic owes to Virgil.

In the markedly self-reflexive context of the poet's defence of his work, a rejection of Livor may well recall Callimachus' Phthonos, spurned by Apollo (*Hymn* 2.107), as well as his 'companion piece' against the critical Telchines in *Aetia* fr. 1. It must be admitted that Livor doesn't necessarily have to be accompanied by Apollo,<sup>93</sup> but the association is a reasonable one to make. Here the Ovidian *praeceptor* (if not, as Holzberg [n. 90] argues, Ovid the poet himself) shows again that he can stand on his

is actually acceptable, and he gives it his blessing at line 40. Although the poet succeeds in persuading the god that the *Remedia Amoris* is a didactic poem of only very limited application (aimed at those who would otherwise be driven to suicide by lovesickness), whether he persuades (or means to persuade) his other readers of this is quite a different matter.

<sup>90</sup> This is a tentative suggestion, since the gap between the hymnic invocation of a god and that god's epiphany can be quite long. Compare, for example, the hundred-line gap between the invocation of Athena and her appearance in Callimachus, *Hymn* 5. We might remember by contrast, however, that Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* begins with epiphany.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. N. Holzberg, *Ovid. The Poet and his Work* (Ithaca and London, 2002), 110, who sees this as a rare occasion when the poet possibly doffs the mask of his *persona* to make a genuine statement about his (i.e. the real Ovid's) views on his poetry.

<sup>92</sup> I find it hard to offer a concise translation of this line: *pede* encompasses both the general point about the need for the poetry to continue in the same well-omened and well-established direction, and a more specific pun on the *pes* as a foot both in the literal sense and the metrical one.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Horace, *Odes* 2.20, where the bird-like poet soars above the city, *inuidia . . . maior* ('greater than envy', 4). In *Amores* 1.15.1, Ovid uses the same phrase as in the *Remedia*, *Livor edax*, in a context where the poet stands alone against Envy. We might remember that there Apollo appears, belatedly, as a mere cup-bearer towards the end. (See the discussion above.) It is also worth bearing in mind the Horatian echo in the word *edax*, used in the equally bombastic (but envy-less) *Odes* 3.30 of the rain which will not wear away the poet's works. *Odes* 3.30 is echoed again at *Remedia* 811 in *hoc opus exegi* ('I have completed this work'); cf. Horace's *exegi monumentum* ('I have completed a monument'), 3.30.1. Ovid feeds on different traditions of poetic self-confidence.

own two feet without Apollo. The later, fairly motiveless epiphany of Apollo seems to me to be pointing the reader back to the god's absence from the poetics/Envy scene.<sup>94</sup>

Indeed, perhaps Apollo's 'late' arrival is something of a theme in the *Remedia Amoris*. I return briefly to the opening passage quoted above, *te precor incipiens* (*Remedia* 75: 'I pray to you as I start'). Might the reader not object that, in a poem of only 814 lines, an invocation which starts at line 75 is slightly on the late side?<sup>95</sup> Before Apollo comes on to the scene, we have already had another re-match between the poet and Amor (1–40), a call to the poem's audience of girls and boys wounded by love (41–54), and a supremely assertive and self-confident claim from the *praeceptor* that had the unhappy lovers of myth only had the opportunity to read the *Remedia*, their various disasters could have been avoided (55–68). Indeed, in lines 69–70, the narrator twice uses the phrase *me duce* ('with me as your guide / leader'),<sup>96</sup> before twice using his name, Naso, in lines 71–2. There can be no doubt as to who is really in charge of this poem.<sup>97</sup>

So, with these uncertainties about Apollo in mind, let us look more closely at the stance the poet takes in the *Remedia Amoris* as love's healer. Near the outset of the work, he calls the wounded lovers to be cured by the hand that wounded them: *discite sanari per quem didicistis amare; / una manus uobis uulnus opemque feret* (*Remedia* 43–4: 'learn to be well from the one through whom you learned to love; one hand will bring you both wound and cure'). It seems that the poet is already setting himself up as a figure analogous to Apollo Opifer, the 'helper' who discovered medicine.<sup>98</sup> We might even be forgiven for thinking at first that the *praeceptor* is going to do it all by himself. The re-match with Amor, where the god first protests against the poem but then is browbeaten into submission, might seem to put an end to the question of divine influence on this poem. But then, as I have discussed, the poet does bring Apollo in, albeit at line 75. Perhaps we are to be kept in a certain amount of doubt as to which of the two—Apollo or the *praeceptor*—will prove to be the true source of healing. The reader will not be overly surprised, however, to find that it is the poet's power and

<sup>94</sup> There is a possible political connection to be made here too. In 'The art of making oneself hated: rethinking Augustanism, non-Augustanism and anti-Augustanism in Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*' (a paper delivered at *Ars Amatoria* 2002: A Bimillennium, Manchester, 6 September 2002), S. Casali suggests that (via the *fulmina Iouis* of *Remedia* 370) we can see Livor 'as' Augustus. He compares the end of the *Metamorphoses*, where we also find Jupiter's thunderbolts, the adjective *edax*, and the prediction *uiuiam*, although there is no Envy.

<sup>95</sup> Contrast Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, whose first line begins the invocation of Venus, and Virgil, *Georgics* 1, which starts with the poet's patron, but moves to a long list of the poet's divine sponsors by line 5. Even the *rejection* of divine inspiration in *Ars Amatoria* 1 begins at line 25. Henderson (n. 85), 39, perhaps aware of the possibility that we might think the invocation somewhat tardy, asserts that the Preface to the work (1–40) is formally dispensable, and it is the Exordium (41–78) which provides the real start of the poem. I am not convinced.

<sup>96</sup> This phrase, *me duce*, is repeated at line 253, immediately after the rejection of magic and the claim that 'our Apollo' brings help without side-effects (251–2: quoted above).

<sup>97</sup> It is interesting, therefore, and perhaps not entirely convincing, to find Apollo later named as the *dux operis* ('leader of the work'): *quod nisi dux operis uatem frustratur Apollo, / aemulus est nostri maxima causa mali* (767–8: 'for unless Apollo, the leader of this work, deceives his poet/priest, a rival is the greatest cause of trouble for us'). As with so many other 'obstacles' in the *Remedia*, this too proves not to be one. The problem: imagining your beloved with another man is bound to inspire jealousy and, thence, the return of love. The solution: don't imagine your beloved with another man. This 'helpful' advice has to be on a par with that towards the start of the poem (also, as it happens, just after a reference to Apollo), where the first cure for love is—wait for it—not to fall in love in the first place (79ff.).

<sup>98</sup> Ovid is the first to call Apollo *opifer*, according to the *OLD* and *TLL*.

primacy which is ultimately asserted. Towards the end of the *Remedia*, Apollo is given his epiphany, for what it's worth, but the closing lines of the work reveal the poet as the 'true' Healer, rather than Apollo.<sup>99</sup> Congratulating himself on the successful completion of his poem, and his (assumed) success in training the lovesick youth of Rome to snap out of it, he urges them to sacrifice to him, not to the god:

hoc opus exegi: fessae date sarta carinae;  
contigimus portus, quo mihi cursus erat.  
postmodo reddetis sacro pia uota poetae,  
carmine sanati femina uirque meo.

*Remedia Amoris* 811–14

I have completed this work: deck the tired ship with garlands. I have reached the harbour where my course was set. Afterwards, you will give pious offerings to the holy poet, man and woman cured by my song.

This is reminiscent of the end of *Ars* 2, where the poet reasserts his claim (made at the start of that book, lines 3–4)<sup>100</sup> on the victory palms, *palmam date, grata iuuentus* (2.733: 'give me the victory palm, grateful young men'), and urges *me uatem celebrate, uiri, mihi dicite laudes* (2.739: 'glorify me, your poet, men, sing praises to me'). Here it is Ovid the poet-healer who has cured his readers, rather than Apollo the Healer. Not only does Ovid not offer us the full-blown, Palatine, Augustan version of the god, but he also downgrades poor old Apollo Medicus. Even in a poem which voices no direct dismissal of the god, we still find Ovid taking centre stage.

The Ovidian elegist sets himself up as, at best, independent of all divine assistance, but, at the very least, as independent of Apollo, the god on whom so many of his predecessors leaned.<sup>101</sup> This, as I hope has been implicitly argued throughout, is not a simple renunciation of Callimachean poetics; indeed, the poet goes out of his way to ensure that his work can be explicitly Callimachean even without Apollo.<sup>102</sup> Neither is it an outright rejection of the idea of poetic inspiration: Ovid does not always deny that he is inspired; it is just that he is not inspired by Apollo. And here comes the political sting in the tail: when Ovid rejects Apollo, he is rejecting not only the god of poetry, but also a god closely connected to Augustus. His decision to downplay Apollo, to avoid mention of the founding of his temple at Cumae by Daedalus, and even to emphasize Apollo's role as a healer (as opposed to warrior and musician) in the

<sup>99</sup> Pace Henderson (n. 85), who argues that the Epilogue (811–14) 'implicitly signifies the completion of the god's task as Ovid's guide'. I would lean on the *implicitly* in this sentence: do the lines not also offer the possibility that the poet is in a significant sense independent of the god? He is *sacer* ('holy'), but perhaps as a result of his own brilliance rather than the god's patronage.

<sup>100</sup> Remember, too, that in the opening of *Ars* 2, the cry 'Io Paeon' turns out to be directed to the poet's success, not the god's help (as discussed above).

<sup>101</sup> I have mentioned at various junctures the poet's growing independence from Cupid, moving from apparent subservience in *Amores* 1.1 to the reversal of the power relationship in the *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris*. The poet similarly likes to keep his distance from Venus, and moves from invoking her aid as something of an afterthought at *Ars* 1.30 (after the assertion of the poet's domination of Cupid and rejection of Apollo) to depicting her more as an admiring reader humbly asking for advice at *Ars* 3.43–56 than as an inspiring divinity. Cf. Gibson (n. 35) ad loc. However, while I would not wish to insist on a complete contrast between the treatment of Apollo and that of other potentially inspiring gods, it does seem to me that Ovid's rejection of divine influence is most comprehensively sustained with Apollo.

<sup>102</sup> As well as 'doubly' Callimachean with Apollo. Cf. Miller (n. 1, 1983) on Ovid's combination of poetic and aetiological Apollos from Callimachus *Aetia* and *Hymn to Apollo* in the epiphany of Apollo in *Ars* 2.

*Remedia* all could be seen as potentially provocative. Some hints are broader, and thus more provocative, than others, but the overall message seems to be clear: this is a poet who, if he cannot be his own master, wishes nevertheless to choose his own master.<sup>103</sup> Through this fraught relationship with Apollo, we catch a glimpse of Ovid the poet picking his way through the marshes of literary tradition and the minefields of Augustan ideology with characteristic mischief and humour.<sup>104</sup>

*Balliol College, Oxford*

REBECCA ARMSTRONG  
rebecca.armstrong@balliol.ox.ac.uk

<sup>103</sup> Here again I agree with Alison Sharrock, who takes a similar view on Ovid's relationship (or lack thereof) with the Muses in the *Metamorphoses*: 'I find it hard to separate Ovid's claims for independence from the Muse from similar attempts throughout his poetic corpus to make himself independent of Augustus. I think that this is not just an act of political protest, but an attempt to renegotiate the position of the poet and ultimately even of the self in a changed world' (n. 1, 2002, 227).

<sup>104</sup> Many thanks to Oliver Lyne, Alison Sharrock, and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.